I have heard from some people that the JCPOA was a bad agreement that needed to be cancelled because it created a pathway for Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon.
Therefore, it becomes important to understand exactly what sunset provisions were in the JCPOA, and their timeframes. It is not sufficient to say, “it had sunset provisions”, leaving the conjecture that those provisions would have provided an absolute pathway for Iran becoming a nuclear power.
The JCPOA took 20 months to negotiate and comprised almost 200 pages of agreements.
No agreement will ever be perfect; there will always be compromises that address concerns of BOTH sides.
Whatever perceived weaknesses were in that agreement, there were tremendous amounts of positives.
I maintain that the correct path forward would have been further negotiations to strengthen and modify the agreement, extending the sunset provisions.
Simply cancelling the agreement, thus freeing Iran to pursue nuclear ambitions, removing the inspectors, and dissolving the international syndicate that had signed onto the agreement along with the U.S. (Germany, France, the UK, China, and Russia), was rash and unproductive.
So, here are the sunset provisions that actually existed in the JCPOA: (note: the agreement acknowledged that there are peaceful uses for nuclear energy in both medicine and energy production; both of which require enrichment levels 10-20 times LESS than what is required for weapons).
Permanent:
- Iran is PERMANENTLY prohibited from EVER seeking, developing, or acquiring nuclear weapons.
- Iran is PERMANENTLY obligated to implement IAEA protocols granting inspectors long-term, intrusive access to both declared and suspected nuclear sites.
5-8 years:
- The sunset of a Ban on Iran importing or exporting heavy conventional weapons like tanks and warships.
- A partial lift of a Cap on Iran’s research, development, and testing of advanced centrifuges
- Expiration of the UN Security Council Resolution limiting Iran’s ballistic missile program.
10 years:
- Lifting of Ban on Iran’s older less-efficient centrifuges in one particular, inspected facility.
- Lifting of the UN procurement channel screening and approving nuclear-related imports to Iran.
- Lifting of the Snapback provisions.
15 years:
- Lifting of the 300-kg limit on Iran’s LOW-ENRICHMENT stockpile
- Expiration of the 3.67% limit on enrichment, allowing higher levels
- Expiration of the Ban on enriching uranium or harboring fissile material at the Fordow complex
- Lifting of Caps on Iran’s heavy-water production
20-25 years:
- Lifting of IAEA surveillance and verification of Iran’s centrifuge rotor tube production
- Lifitng of IAEA monitoring of Iran’s raw uranium mills.
Unilaterally cancelling the JCPOA, freeing Iran from ANY and ALL restrictions was a rash, ill-advised, move.
You cannot build a house by excavating a foundation and then blowing that foundation up because you were afraid that the house would have been used by drug dealers.